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Abstract A theoretical framework for estimating the economic value of the federal
government's offshore oil and gas resources is developed. This framework is then
applied to geological and economic data generated by the Minerals Management
Service in support of their five-year leasing plan. With an 8 percent real discount rate
and a 1 percent real price growth rate, the remaining economic rent as of 1987 on
the reserves plus the undiscovered offshore oil and gas resources is estimated at
$118.6 billion (1987 dollars). The present value of the government's receipts from
cash bonus and royalty payments on these deposits is estimated at $37.2 billion. Over
80 percent of the remaining economic rent is derived from developed reserve deposits
located in the Gulf of Mexico. The private sector has previously paid cash bonuses
for the leases located on those deposits and financed the installation of the
development platforms. Because of this, the government will collect only a small
portion, approximately 22 percent, of the rent remaining on those reserves.
Keywords oil, gas, economic value, rent, outer continental shelf, energy,
government revenues.
Introduction
The federal government's extensive holdings of oil and gas properties have a large
economic value and are an important source of revenue. From 1954 through 1986, cash
bonus and royalty payments from offshore oil and gas leases totaled $134 billion (1987
dollars).' Revenue streams of this magnitude have significant implications for fiscal and
monetary policy. For example, receipts from oil and gas leases reduce the need to raise
revenue through general taxation.
* Address reprint requests to Donald Rosenthal, U.S. Department of the Interior, 18th and C St.
N.W., Mail Stop #4412, Washington, DC 20240.
' The findings and opinions expressed in this paper reflect those of the authors and not those of the
Department of the Interior.
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Several federal microeconomic policies are also infiuenced by the economic value of
the nation's oil and gas rights. The Minerals Management Service (MMS) recently
completed a five-year leasing plan for federal areas of the Outer Continental Shelf
(OCS). There is considerable opposition to leasing in certain locations, such as off the
California coast, because of perceived adverse environmental consequences. The oppor-
tunity cost of permanently banning leasing in that area equals the economic rent of the
Califomian OCS deposits. Delays in leasing can also have an economic cost (benefit)
equal to the decline (increase) in the rent that results from the delay. Information on
economic value is also important because it can be used to help develop sale schedules
on the OCS. From an economic efficiency perspective, leases should be sold sequen-
tially in order of net economic value per barrel. By scheduling more sales in areas with
high values, an efficient ordering is more likely to occur.
A better understanding of the economic value of the nation's energy resources also
helps to clarify and sharpen the meaning of "resource." When setting energy policy,
decision makers want information about the amount of energy resources remaining in the
nation. The answer to this question depends on assumptions about future energy prices
and costs. Some government estimates have completely ignored the effect of exploration
costs on the economic viability of a potential deposit (U.S. Geological Survey 1981;
Cooke 1985). The economic assumptions underlying these estimates have not been ade-
quately documented. The question "How much is left?" is not sufficiently precise to
answer without specifying a set of accompanying geological and economic conditions
and establishing a time horizon in which to find and/or produce the resource. What is a
resource under one set of conditions is often not a resource under another.
The purposes of this paper are to (1) estimate the economic rent associated with the
government's offshore oil and gas resources, and (2) to reassess the value of the leased
and unleased resources as a source of future federal revenues. We focus on offshore oil
and gas resources for two reasons. First, reports by Boskin et al. (1985) and Boskin and
Robinson (1987) estimated that the net present value (NPV) of future federal revenues
from the government's onshore plus offshore holdings in 1981 was $656 billion (1987
dollars); of this total, $498 billion was attributed to offshore holdings.^ Although we feel
the earlier figures overstated the value of the offshore accumulations, they are large
enough to warrant a separate assessment. Second, detailed geophysical, geologic, and
economic data are available on the offshore federal lands. Our methodology requires
these detailed data, which are not readily available for the onshore federal lands. This
limits the scope of our analyses but also increases their accuracy.
Our analyses show that the remaining economic rent of the oil and gas resources on
the OCS is $118.6 billion. Much of this value is due to investment in exploration and
development by the private sector, which also paid the government monies to acquire the
leases. Because of these past investments the private sector will receive a large propor-
tion of the rent. We estimate the NPV of future federal revenues from OCS bonus and
royalty payments to be about $37.2 billion. Our estimates represent a major downward
revision in the earlier value estimates by Boskin and associates. Even after adjusting for
differences in the price assumptions and the discount rates used in the two sets of
studies, our estimate of the NPV of future revenues is about one-third of theirs.
Why The New Estimates Are Lower
Our estimates are lower than earlier estimates for four main reasons: (1) the price of oil
fell dramatically between 1981 and 1987, (2) Boskin et al. used incorrect data inputs, (3)Economic Value of the OCS 173
there is less resource remaining due both to production and disappointing exploration
results in the Atlantic and Alaska OCS, and (4) there are significant methodological
differences between the two studies. Each reason and its effect on the estimate are
discussed below.
Price Drop
In 1981 the average landed price of crude oil imports was, in 1987 dollars, $46 per
barrel (U.S. Department of Energy 1987). By mid-1987, this had dropped roughly 61
percent in real terms to about $18 per barrel. By 1985, when the Boskin et al. study was
published, the price had already dropped to $28. Despite this fall, Boskin et al. assumed
that post-1981 prices would rise at a real annual rate of 1 to 3 percent.
In the correction and update to their 1985 estimates, Boskin and Robinson (1987) re-
estimated the present value of the future revenues from the nation's onshore plus off-
shore oil and gas as of 1986. This updated estimate reflects the effect of the 1986 price
shock. The updated 1986 estimate is $346 billion (1987 dollars), a real drop of 47
percent during the five years since 1981. If the offshore estimate dropped by the same
percentage, in 1986 the Boskin et al. estimate for offshore resources would equal $263
billion. This $263 billion estimate is still over seven times our base case estimate of
$37.2 billion. Thus the price change accounts for some but not all of the difference
between our estimates and those of Boskin and associates.
Incorrect Data Inputs
The second reason for the difference between the estimates is that in both their original
and revised papers, Boskin et al. misinterpreted the resource estimates published by the
Minerals Management Service (MMS 1983). To explain this error, it is necessary to
describe how MMS generates its undiscovered resource estimates. First, MMS divides
the OCS into 22 separate planning areas, based on geographical and geological charac-
teristics. Within each planning area, the agency considers all the known and projected oil
and gas prospects above a minimum threshold commercial size. A prospect is a geologic
feature having the potential for trapping and accumulating hydrocarbons. The expected
quantity of hydrocarbons that can be economically developed in the ith (i = 1 . . Nj)
prospect in the jth (j = 1 . . J) planning area is
f" Qijh(Oij)dOij (1)
JMJ
where: Oy is the quantity of resources, expressed in barrels of oil equivalent (BOE,
5,620 cubic feet of gas equals one BOE), in prospect ij; h(Oij) is the probability density
function for Oy given that one or more prospects in planning area j contains economi-
cally developable hydrocarbons; Mj is the minimum deposit size that is economically
developable following exploration and discovery;^ and Aj is the probability of one or
more prospects in planning area j containing economically developable hydrocarbons."
The expected quantity of economically developable hydrocarbons in the planning
area, Rj, is simply the sum over all the prospects or174 D, H: Rosenthal, M, B. Rose, and L, J, Slaski
IJ (2)
The number used by Boskin et al. for the quantity of hydrocarbons in the OCS was not
RJ. Instead, they mistakenly used a number representing the expected quantity of eco-
nomically developable resources in a planning area given that one or more prospects in
the area contains economically developable hydrocarbons. This number, denoted R'j, is
calculated as Rj = Rj/Aj. By using R'j, Boskin et al. assumed that at least one prospect in
every area contained commercially feasible accumulations of hydrocarbons. In planning
areas where no such accumulations have, as yet, been discovered, Rj will be greater than
Rj. In the MMS (1983) estimates used by Boskin et al., the quantity of economically
developable oil and gas in the OCS, conditional on each area having one or more
commercial fields, was 49.0 billion barrels of oil equivalent (BBOE). The more econom-
ically meaningful number representing the expected quantity of economically develop-
able oil and gas, based on the MMS (1983) information, was 44.1 BBOE.
Failing to correct for the probability of a planning area containing one or more
prospects with economically developable hydrocarbons, although a major conceptual
error, did not significantly affect the results. However, if the same error were repeated
on the new resource estimates (MMS 1987), it would significantly affect the results.
Between 1983 and 1987, many of the Aj factors have been revised downwards, and,
therefore, the difference between RJ and Rj becomes more pronounced.
A more practically significant misunderstanding of the resource estimates by Boskin
et al. concerns the definition of economically developable resources.' Equation (1)
shows that a prospect can contain economically developable resources, R^, but not be
worth exploring. Equation (1) estimates the quantity of hydrocarbons that are economi-
cally developable, given that exploration costs have already been incurred. With explo-
ration costs for each prospect ranging from $5 million to $150 million, a prospect might
be economically developable, given the exploration costs are sunk, but not worth explor-
ing. Only the best prospects warrant exploration.
For our analyses, we have defined a new quantity measure, "explorable resources,"
defined as follows
Lij = Rij if E[ATNPVij] > 0 (3)
= 0 otherwise
where: Ly is the quantity of explorable resources; and E[ATNPVij] is the expected after-
tax net present value of exploring and subsequently developing any commercial finds on
prospect ij. The summation of L^ over all prospects in a planning area gives the current
quantity of explorable resources in the area, Lj. Because of the definition of (3), the
quantity of explorable resources in an area is less than the quantity of developable
resources Rj. The Lj measure only includes resources from those prospects that we
estimate are profitable for a firm to explore.
The Boskin et al. analysis used the amount of economically developable resources as
the quantity variable to value unexplored resources. This resulted in an upward bias in
their quantity measure, because many of the developable prospects are not explorable.
As of mid-1987, we estimate that only 52 percent of the undiscovered resources on the
OCS that are classified as economically developable are contained in explorable pros-
pects.* When this relationship is combined with the conditional nature of the measuresEconomic Value of the OCS 175
used by Boskin et al., we can begin to see why their quantity measure of 49.0 BBOE is
roughly two and one-half times the 19.8 BBOE we now estimate are either leased and
unexplored or unleased and unexplored (see Table 1, see page 181).
Poor Exploration Results
The third reason for the difference between the two sets of estimates is that new geologi-
cal and geophysical data have become available in recent years. The poorer than ex-
pected exploration results in the Atlantic and Alaska OCS regions have caused revisions
in the estimates of the amount of undiscovered and economically recoverable oil and gas
there is in the OCS. Between 1981 and 1986, there were numerous exploration wells
drilled in the Atlantic and Alaskan OCS regions, and not a single one yielded a commer-
cial field.' As a result, the estimate of the amount of undiscovered economically devel-
opable oil has been revised downward. In the 1983 figures used by Boskin et al., the
estimate was 44.1 BBOE (MMS 1983); in the recently issued five-year plan the same
figure was 27.0 BBOE (MMS 1987).^
Methodological Differences
The fourth reason for the difference in value estimates between our study and the Boskin
et al. study lies in methodology. Our estimates of economic rent and the NPV of govern-
ment receipts for undiscovered resources are based upon prospect by prospect dis-
counted cash flow models for explorable prospects only. The results from these models
are then aggregated to yield regional and national value estimates. Boskin et al. quanti-
fied government revenues by assuming that the future ratio of bonus receipts to royalty
receipts would parallel the past ratio. This assumption is tenable only in the unlikely
event that past leasing policies, and economic and geologic trends are repeated. In 1983
the ratio of bonuses to royalty collections was 1.66, whereas in 1986 the ratio was 0.07.
The Boskin et al. methodology estimated only the NPV of future government re-
ceipts. We estimated that figure and economic rent as well. The distinction between rent
and the NPV of government revenues is most apparent when our valuation methodology
is applied to reserves. When calculating the economic rent for fields producing oil and
gas, we treated the development and exploration costs as sunk costs. Within this frame-
work, rent is the difference between the NPV of remaining revenues and remaining
production costs, and government receipts are the NPV of the future royalty payments.
For reserves, rent is considerably larger than the government receipts.
This disparity between government revenues and economic rent was expected; they
are different concepts. The NPV of the future government revenues only counts future
payments; the present value of cash bonuses already paid to acquire the leases is not
included. When the rent on producing fields is calculated, previous exploration/
development costs are ignored. Thus our measure of rent for producing fields includes
quasi-rents to production capital already in place. Our study focuses on the remaining
rent from the resources given the investment to date. If adjustments were made in our
calculations to reflect previous lease payments and investments by the private sector,
then our results would likely show that the government collected the majority of the rent.
Mead et al. (1980) consider this subject in detail."
Another important methodological difference between our study and that of Boskin
et al. is the dissimilar discount rates and price growth rates used. Boskin et al. employed
a 3 percent discount rate and a 3 percent price growth rate; we used a 6 and 8 percent176 D. H. Rosenthal, M. B. Rose, and L. J. Slaski
discount rate in combination with a 1 or 2 percent price growth rate. In the results
section we approximate what our estimates would have been had we employed a 3
percent discount rate and a 3 percent price growth rate. This change raises our estimates
by two to three times, but still leaves it one-third of Boskin's and associ-
ates.
The Value of the OCS Resources
Theory
The rent and present value of future government receipts from the OCS oil and gas
resources are affected by many factors including the current oil and gas price, the future
price path, the rate the resources are extracted, the pace at which unleased resources are
made available for exploration and development, and the discount rate. This section
develops a general model of economic value that accounts for these and other factors.
The model is applicable to the four sets of resources described be-
low.'
Unleased and unexplored: Undiscovered resources that we estimate are, or will become,
explorable, but are contained on tracts that have not yet been leased. Resources are
explorable if the expected profits from investing in exploration are nonnegative.
Leased and unexplored: Undiscovered resources that have been leased, but no explora-
tion has yet occurred.
Undeveloped reserves: Resources contained in known oil and gas fields, but no produc-
tion has yet occurred.
Developed reserves: Resources contained in known and developed oil and gas fields that
are now, or were in the past, producing.
The expected NPV of exploring and subsequently developing a prospect found to contain
commercial accumulations of hydrocarbons is
E[NPVij] Aj= Is (1 - yj)(yjr)*(P8' " k^j) J" Oijh(Oij)dQij
- i; r' (" F(Q;j)h(Oij)dQij - {" D(Oij)h(Oij)dOij| " Xj (4)
where: (1 - yj) = fraction of the resource Oy extracted each year; r = an annual
discount factor computed as 1/(1 + z), where z is the real discount rate; g = an annual
growth factor for oil and gas prices; Pj = the staning price of the resource;'" kjj = the
per BOE extraction cost; F(Oij) = the annual fixed operating cost as a function of the
field size; D(Oij) = the present value of the one-time development costs as a function of
the field size; and Xj = the present value of exploration costs. In (4) the exploration
costs are the same regardless of the outcome of exploration and are bome for all the
prospects. All the other costs are bome only if an economically developable deposit is
found. The (1 - yj)y' term in (4) gives the ponion of the original deposit size that is
extracted in year t. This formula is a discrete version of an exponential decline function,
which is often used to model oil and gas production.
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E[NPVij] = AjE[Oij|develop][PjUj - ^Vj - O^j - H.j] - Xj
= Rij[PjUj - ^\^ - Gij - H^ - Xij] (5)
where: E[Q|j|develop] = expected quantity of resource given an economically develop-
able find,
T
Uj = S (1 - yj)(yjrg)' = a revenue discount factor,
1-0
T
Vj = V (1 - yj)(yjr)' = a production discount factor.
l-O
Gij = ^ r'E[$fixed|develop]/E[Oij]|develop],
t-O
= expected present value of fixed costs per barrel
given a developable find,
Hy = E[$Development|develop]/E[Oij|develop],
= expected present value of development costs per
barrel given development, and
Xij = Xj/Rij = expected exploration costs per barrel."
The term inside the lower square brackets, [ ], of (5) is the expected net economic value
(NEV) per barrel of economically explorable oil. We have computed the per barrel NEV
for the explorable resources in each of the planning areas in the OCS (MMS 1987,
Appendix F). These NEV figures are an integral part of our valuation methodology.'^
Thus we can further simplify (5) as
(6)
where: NEV(O)ij indicates the net economic value per barrel from commencing explora-
tion in year zero and subsequently developing any commercial finds. If NEV(O)ij is
negative, then the resources are not explorable and were excluded from our year zero
valuation. As explained below, prospects that are not explorable in early years of our
analysis can become explorable in later years due to price growth.
Equation (6) is also applicable to resources that have been leased, but not yet ex-
plored. Multiplying the expected quantity of unexplored and leased resources in a plan-
ning area by the corresponding NEV produces an estimate of the economic rent of the
resources. We have extended this methodology to undeveloped and developed reserves.
To calculate the NEV per barrel for undeveloped reserves, we set the exploration
costs and exploration time requirements to zero and recalculated NEV. For developed
reserves we followed the same procedure except that the development costs and develop-
ment time requirements were also set to zero. The NEV figure for each class of re-178 D. H. Rosenthal, M. B. Rose, and L. J. Slaski
serves, undeveloped and developed, was then multiplied by the corresponding reserve
amount. The product estimates the remaining rent for each class of reserves.
For resources that are unleased and unexplored, it is necessary to extend equation
(6). The extension is needed because not all of the resources that are explorable are, in
fact, instantly leased. Actual leasing is not instantaneous for at least two reasons: (1) the
prelease costs necessary to identify and evaluate prospects make it expensive for firms to
bid on a large number of leases, and (2) MMS offers leases for sale in different planning
areas on a periodic basis and, in fact, has often restricted the acreage available for
leasing. Because the resources are leased at different times, the economic value mea-
sures must reflect the leasing date.
To simplify the extension of equation (6) to unleased and unexplored resources, we
have assumed that all of the prospects that we have identified as explorable are equally
likely to be leased in any given year. This is a restrictive assumption for two reasons.
First, the market's perception of the resource base will inevitably differ from the govem-
ment's. Firms might lease prospects that we have identified as unexplorable or they may
refuse to lease prospects we have identified as explorable. We recognize this deficiency
in our methodology, especially as a model for predicting whether firms will lease spe-
cific tracts. However, for aggregate calculations of resource value, this assumption is
tenable so long as the govemment does not consistently see more or less explorable
prospects than industry. Second, it is likely that explorable prospects with high economic
value will be based before explorable prospects with low economic value. Our assump-
tion that all prospects are equally likely to be leased ignores this effect and, therefore,
tends to understate economic value.
Given the assumption that all explorable prospects are equally likely to be leased, the
expected NEV of an explorable barrel of oil leased in year t in planning area j is a
weighted average of the prospect specific NEV measures, or
NEV(t)j = ^ Wij E[NEV(t)ij] (7)
i-l
where: w^ = L^/Lj and NEV(t)ij is evaluated from the square bracket portion of (5), [ ],
using the price of oil in year t as the starting price of oil.''
The expected total amount of explorable resources in year zero in a planning area is
Lj. If 100(1 - Cj) percent of those resources are leased each year, then the expected
NPV of the resources is:'''
E[NPVj] = I; (1 - c)(cr)'L[NEV(t)]
t-O
00
= ]^ (1 - c)(cr)'L[PUg' - kV - G - H - X]
t-O
= J (1 - c)(cr)'L[NEV(O) -I- PU(g' - 1)]
1-0
- ergEconomic Value of the OCS 179
Equation (6) is a special case of (8), where c is set equal to zero. Setting c = 0 in (8) is
equivalent to assuming that all the leasable resources are instantly leased. The closer c is
to one, the slower the pace of leasing and the lower the economic value. We have
calibrated c for each of four regions to correspond to the pace of leasing projected in the
recently issued five-year OCS leasing plan (MMS 1987). Every planning area within a
region has the same pace of leasing. The pacing factors used by MMS were professional
judgments based upon the agency's previous leasing experience.
Equation (8) gives the expected NPV of the resources that are initially explorable in
year zero and are subsequently leased at a rate represented by 1 - c. However, it does
not provide the total NPV of the unleased and unexplored resources. As time progresses
and prices rise, resources that were previously not explorable become explorable. For
resources that become explorable in year one, as opposed to year zero, a new equation
(8) process is started, but lagged by one year. Accordingly, the total NPV of the unleased
and unexplored resources is"
Total [NPVj] = I; L*(l - c)r' [^IXm + pg'u f-J T^—)] (9)
,.0 L 1 - cr \1 - erg 1 - cr/J
where: L,* is the resources that become explorable in year t; and NEV(O), is the NEV per
barrel for resources that become explorable in year t and are then immediately leased.
For t = 0, L* is the initial quantity of explorable resources. To estimate L* for the
subsequent years, we used information published by MMS (MMS 1987, Appendix F)
that shows the quantity of explorable resources at different prices. By calculating the
year that our assumed price path reached the price/quantity points MMS published, we
were able to estimate Lf. We used linear interpolation to approximate values between
points provided in the MMS table.'*
To evaluate equation (9) it is necessary to know NEV(O),. For the resources initially
explorable in year zero, MMS has published an estimate of NEV per barrel for each of
the planning areas in the OCS. For years one and beyond we estimated NEV(O),, recog-
nizing that resources that have just become explorable in year t have approximately a
zero expected after-tax net present value (ATNPV) to a private firm in year t.
The E[ATNPV] of a lease in planning area j is approximated by
E[ATNPVj] = L*[(Pg'U - sV)(l - b) - Z](l - tax) (10)
where: s is the pier barrel shipping costs," b is the royalty rate, and Z = kV + G -I-
H -I- X'. By setting ATNVP equal to zero and solving for the social NPV, as in equation
(4), the following result is obtained:
E[NPV(O)J = L*[UPg' - Z] = L*[UbPg' -f- sV(l - b)] (11)
From equation (11) it is apparent that the NEV of an expected barrel that becomes
leasable in year t and is leased in the same year is'*
NEV(O), = UbPg" -I- sV (1 - b) (12)
Substituting equation (12) into (9) allows us to calculate the total NPV of the unleased180 D, H, Rosenthal, M, B, Rose, and L J, Slaski
and undiscovered resources. By adding the result across all the planning areas, the
expected NPV of the unleased and unexplored resources on the QCS is obtained.
Our methodology does not take into account the external benefits and costs of pro-
ducing oil and gas on the QCS. Possible benefits of domestic production include increas-
ing national security and avoiding the pecuniary portion of the import premium. Esti-
mates of the magnitude of these two benefits combined have been in the $8 to $18 per
barrel range (Broadman 1981). The primary negative effect of production is environ-
mental externalities. Appendix G of the Minerals Management Service Five-Year Plan
(MMS 1987) contains detailed estimates of the expected net environmental costs from
OCS production. The maximum environmental cost per barrel in any of the 22 QCS
planning areas is $0.04 per barrel; in the Gulf of Mexico, where most of the resource is
located, the cost is $0.01 per barrel. These costs are approximately two orders of magni-
tude below our estimates of net economic value per barrel. Thus, including the Appen-
dix G estimates of environmental costs would have had only a trivial downward effect on
our estimates of the economic value of the OCS oil and gas resources.
In sununary, the NPV of three of the four classes of oil and gas resources was
calculated using equation (4) and then aggregating the results across prospects and re-
gions." The NPV of the undiscovered and unleased resources was calculated using
equations (9) and (12). When using equation (4) to value undeveloped reserves, the
exploration costs and time requirements were set to zero; for developed reserves the
exploration plus development costs and time requirements were set to zero.
Results s
The data for estimating the NPV of the OCS oil and gas resources were drawn from
MMS documents, reports, and computer models. The major source of data was the
analysis done to support formulation of the recently issued five-year leasing plan for the
OCS (MMS 1987, Appendix F). The leasing plan analysis shows estimates of the
amount of explorable resources and the NEV per barrel in each planning area at different
prices.^" We used estimates that correspond to the expected amount of resources in each
planning area. In the unexplored areas, these estimates are very difficult to develop and
the actual amount of resource eventually discovered could be much different than today's
expected amount.
For our analyses, we have used the same economic assumptions employed in the
analysis done for the five-year leasing plan (MMS 1987): an 8 percent real discount rate,
a 1 percent real price growth rate, and a 5 percent inflation rate. The latter rate is
relevant when computing tax liabilities for producers. We set the starting price of oil at
$18 per barrel and gas was assumed to sell at two-thirds the price of oil based on BTUs.
The main results of our analysis are presented in Tables 1,2, and 3. Table 1 shows
the quantity of resources falling into the four resource classes for each major geographic
division of the OCS. Roughly 82 percent of the oil and gas that is now economic, or will
become economic by the year 2016, is contained in the Gulf of Mexico (27.4 billion
barrels of oil equivalent (BBOE) out of a total of 33.5 BBQE). Following the Gulf is the
Pacific region, the Alaska and Atlantic regions are third and fourth. The majority of
resources in Alaska and the Atlantic are contained in the leased and unexplored class.
Given the poorer than expected exploration results in those regions and today's low
prices, it is likely that most outstanding leases in those regions will expire prior to
exploration.
The row totals of Table 1 show that the largest class of resource on the OCS isEconomic Value of the OCS
Table 1
Estimated Resources in Each Resource










































"Millions barrels of oil equivalent.
*Our methodology gives a separate number for unleased and unexplored resources, L,* in
equation (9), for each year between 1987 and 2016, inclusive. This row shows the total of these
quantities added over all the years.
developed reserves (12.0 BBOE). The next largest class is unleased and unexplored
(10.6 BBOE). This figure is less than the developed reserves because we have included
only unexplored resources that will become explorable by the year 2016. As discussed
earlier, there are considerably less explorable resources than economically developable
resources. Of the 33.5 BBOE shown in Table 1, about 40 percent are discovered and 60
percent remain to be discovered.
The rent, or net economic value, of the resources is listed in Table 2. The most
striking aspect of Table 2 is the magnitude of the rent in the developed reserves class.
Table 2
Net Present Value of the Resources in Each Resource









































"This table assumes a 1 percent per annum real price growth rate for oil and gas, an 8 percent
real discount rate, a starting oil price of $18, and the price of gas at two-thirds the price of oil
based on BTUs. Reserve estimates are based on June 1986 figures (the latest available), and
undiscovered resources are as estimated for mid-1987 by MMS (1987).182 D. H. Rosenthal, M. B. Rose, and L. J. Slaski
3
Estimated Present Value of Govemment Receipts









































Over two-thirds of the total value is contained in that class ($84.6 billion of $118.6
billion); within the class, 96 percent of the economic value is in the Gulf of Mexico
($81.2 billion of $84.6 billion). In present value terms, the developed reserves are the
most valuable asset to the nation on the OCS. The rights to most of this value are vested
in the private sector owing to their previous expenses for cash bonus payments, explora-
tion, and development.
The high value of the developed reserves indicates the importance of exploration and
development costs on the OCS. In our analysis, we treated the existing platforms and
exploration expenses as sunk costs for the developed reserves. This made the NEV per
barrel high for developed reserves. The NEV per barrel is easily calculated as the Table
2 entry divided by the corresponding entry in Table 1. For the developed reserves as a
group, the NEV per barrel is $7.04. This value is well below the difference between
price and the variable production cost, because of the time it takes to extract the resource
and the resulting decrease in its present value.
After the developed reserves class, the next most valuable class of resources is the
leased and unexplored class ($14.9 billion). We had expected the value of the unleased
and unexplored resources ($12.3 billion) to exceed the leased and undiscovered re-
sources. The fact that this did not occur reflects the large inventory of leases in private
hands waiting to be explored. It also shows how little of the OCS is explorable given the
current prices and our assumptions about future conditions.
Most of the existing unexplored leases in private hands were purchased when prices
where higher. The subsequent fall in prices has dampened exploration and is already
resulting in many of the leases expiring prior to being explored. This is especially true in
the Atlantic region where no exploration is now occurring. To the extent this occurs,
resources are shifted back into the unleased and undiscovered class.^'
Table 3 shows estimates of the present value of the future govemment leasing re-
ceipts for each class of resource. Profit taxes from OCS operations are not included. For
the unleased and unexplored resources, we have assumed that the govemment collects
80 percent of the economic rent in the form of cash bonuses and royalty payments. This
percentage is approximate and is based upon Mead's work (1980). The exclusion of
profit taxes from govemment receipts understates total revenue somewhat, but it does
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For the other three classes of resources, we have tabulated the present value of the
future royalty payments. They were calculated as^^
PV [Royaltyj] = ^ Rcjb(PU,j - sV,j) (13)
where: R^j is the expected amount of developable resources contained in the cth class
(c = 1, 2, 3) in the jth planning area.
The present value of the govertiment leasing receipts is $37.2 billion, of which half,
$18.6 billion, will come from the developed reserves. The disparity between receipts
and rent does not mean that the govemment is failing to collect the rent; rather it reflects
our accounting stance. We have not counted the cash bonuses already received when
calculating future govemment receipts. Nor have future tax payments been included as a
part of the government leasing receipts. Because of this, a smaller percentage of the rent
is captured as revenue for the reserves as compared to the unleased and unexplored
class.
Our analysis shows that the OCS leasing program has already received far more
revenues than it is likely to receive in the future. Between 1954 and the end of 1986, the
govemment received $134 billion in cash bonuses and royalty payments (undiscounted
1987 dollars). The present value of these payments appreciated to 1987 at 8 percent is
$331 billion. Either figure is much higher than the $37.2 billion we have estimated as
the present value of future receipts.
The results shown in Tables 1,2, and 3 depend on our assumed oil price ($18 per
barrel) discount rate (8 percent) and price growth rate (1 percent). Table 4 shows the
economic rent and present value of future govemment receipts for different combina-
tions of discount rates and price growth rates. As expected, our results for rent and
revenues are both sensitive to the combination of rates used. Although not shown in
Table 4, the estimates of the value of the unleased and unexplored resources were
particularly sensitive to changes in the discount rate and price growth rate. This follows
because production from those resources occurs far in the future and its value is, there-
fore, highly dependent upon the Table 4 factors.
The case using a 3 percent discount rate and 3 percent price growth shown in Table 4
Table 4
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corresponds to the same discount rate and price growth rate assumptions used by Boskin
et al. in their analyses of the value of future govemment leasing receipts from the OCS
(1985, 1987). Under these assumptions we estimate the rent to be approximately $353.2
billion and present value of govemment receipts to be $144 billion.^^ This government
receipts estimate is 3.9 times higher than our base case estimate, but it is still well below
Boskin et al. The Boskin and Robinson (1987) estimate for 1986 for offshore is approxi-
mately $263 billion (1987 dollars). However, in 1986 the "free-on-board" price of
imports was roughly $13 (1987 dollars, U.S. Department of Energy 1987). This is well
below our assumed world oil price of $18 per barrel. When our world oil price assump-
tion is lowered to $13, using a 3 percent discount rate and a 3 percent price growth rate,
our estimate of govemment receipts is $87 billion (1987 dollars), about one-third of the
comparable Boskin and Robinson (1987) estimate for 1986.
Table 5 shows the effect of increasing the 1987 world oil price and maintaining the
base case discount rate and price growth rate. Thus Table 5 indicates the effect of a one-
time sustained price shock on economic value. Consistent with the findings of Boskin et
al., price shocks result in significant changes in estimates of economic value.
Our valuation methodology assumes that there are no cost-reducing technological
advances related to finding or producing oil and gas on the OCS. This assumption was
necessary because the underlying MMS data set on which our analysis is based also
assumes no technological change. Technological advances would affect economic value
in much the same manner as a price increase. Either type of change increases the
difference between price and cost and, thereby, raises net economic value. Thus for a
given price growth rate, our estimates of economic value are downwardly biased be-
cause they fail to account for technological change.
The bias from failing to consider technological change is probably small. Most of the
economically significant expenses have already occurred or will occur in the near future.
On the OCS the most costly item is a development platform. For reserves, the platforms
are already in place and for the other classes of resources the platform AS installed at the
beginning of the production cycle. Thus the amount of time available for technological
change to occur and significantly reduce cost is limited. For example, a 1 percent
decrease per year in real costs will have less of an effect on economic value than a 1
percent per year increase in real prices. The differences in the Table 4 figures can,
therefore, be reinterpreted as upper-bound estimates of the effect of cost-reducing tech-
nological change on economic value.
The potential for technological change altering the results is greatest for unleased and
unexplored resources. A technological breakthrough might result in vast new areas of
the OCS becoming economically profitable to produce. This would fundamentally alter
the resource base and could produce large increases in the amount and value of that
resource class. Even in the absence of technological change, there are major uncertain-
ties about the actual resource base on the OCS. The confidence band around our value
estimates is large.
Summary and Discussion
Depending on the combination of discount rates and price growth assumptions used, the
net present value of the OCS oil and gas resources is between $118.6 and $353.2 billion.
For all of the combinations of discount rates and price growth rates shown in Table 4,
developed reserves were the most valuable class of resource on the OCS. Most of the
remaining economic value on the OCS is contained in the Gulf of Mexico.Economic Value of the OCS 185
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"This table uses an 8 percent real discount rate and assumes real prices will grow at
1 percent per annum from the 1987 price level.
The present value of the future govemment bonus and royalty receipts ranged from
$37.2 to $144 billion. These figures are considerably lower than the corresponding ones
for economic rent. They illustrate the importance of distinguishing between rent and
govemment revenues when discussing the economic value of the OCS. The revenue
figures are more important for budgeting decisions and for govemmental programs
dependent on the OCS revenues. The economic rent figures are more relevant for re-
source allocation decisions.
Boskin et al. (1985) placed the present value of the future cash bonus and royalty
recepts in 1981 at $498 billion (1987 dollars). The figure is 13 times higher than our
base case (8 percent discount rate and 1 percent price growth). When we employ the
same price and discounting assumptions as Boskin et al., our estimate of govemment
receipts is roughly one-third of theirs. The reasons for the differences between the two
sets of estimates were discussed earlier.
The effect of current and expected future economic conditions on economic value is
obvious and significant. Equally significant, but considerably less obvious, is the dy-
namic nature of the inventory of explorable resources. Changes in economic conditions
and the results of new exploration wells both modify the inventory of explorable re-
sources. To date, resource estimates published by the govemment have not linked the
inventory of explorable resources to economic conditions. For example, the 1980 U.S.
Geological Survey (USGS) estimates were developed, "under conditions represented by
the continuation of price-cost relationships and technological trends that prevailed at the
time of the assessment" (USGS 1981, p. 7). If economic conditions change, the USGS
(1981) estimates do not give enough information to reassess the effect of the change on
economic value.
In the future, geologists, engineers, and economists should work closely when esti-
mating the quantity of economically recoverable resources. Functional relationships be-
tween prices, costs, and the quantity of economically explorable resources are far more
usefiil for policy decisions than single point estimates. We were able to develop the
needed price/quantity relationships by analyzing proprietary govemment data. The sum-
mary functional relationships are not confidential and are a valuable source of informa-
tion for a variety of policy decisions.^*
It is difficult for a govemment agency to develop estimates of the inventory of
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majority of geological and geophysical data ever collected on the OCS, it does not have
access to the interpretation of that data by the private sector, which might see opportuni-
ties the govemment missed, and vice versa. However, because there are tens of energy
companies and only one govemment agency, the possibility of the govemment understat-
ing the inventory exists. The govemment is aware of this and makes adjustments in its
estimates.
We have recently begun to use bidding theory (Milgrom and Weber 1982) to explain
the results of the observed bids in OCS lease sales. In a recent sale in the Gulf of
Mexico, the MMS received bids on many more prospects than our bidding-theory based
model predicted. One explanation of this result is that the MMS data base of explorable
prospects is too small. By back-solving the model, we can estimate what the inventory of
explorable prospects perceived by the bidders as a group had to be in order to produce
the observed results. This work is in the preliminary stages, but it suggests an area of
research where economic theory could be applied to help develop resource estimates.
Our results suggest that the cost of exploring for oil and gas needs more careful
consideration when future estimates of the amount of economically recoverable oil and
gas are developed. Exploration costs should logically be considered when the quantity of
undiscovered, economically recoverable resources is estimated. Our results show that
exploration costs make a significant difference in the resulting estimates.
The estimates of the quantity of reserves is another area where interdisciplinary work
between economists, geologists, and engineers is essential. The reserve estimates we
have used for our calculations show, in the terminology of Circular 860 USGS (1981),
measured plus indicated reserves. These are reserves whose existence is supported di-
rectly by engineering measurements or are contained in known productive reservoirs and
would respond to improved recovery techniques. There is another category of reserves
not even represented in our numbers: inferred reserves. These are reserves that will
likely be added to known fields as the area is more intensively drilled. They are the most
speculative of the three classes of reserves identified in Circular 860. The MMS does not
keep formal records of inferred reserves and, therefore, we have not valued them."
Policymakers desire accurate and unbiased resource estimates in order to make in-
formed decisions on issues such as the fill rate for the strategic petroleum reserve,
whether to levy an oil import tax, assessing the impacts of an oil supply dismption on
national security, and whether the economic benefits of developing energy in an environ-
mentally sensitive area outweigh the risks. To be most useful for policy purposes, the
resource estimates should be related to economic conditions. In particular, it is essential
to know how the size of the economically viable resource base changes when prices and/
or costs change.
The magnitude of the differences between our estimates and the estimates of Boskin
et al. (1985) indicates the need for continued work in this area. I^ven if an accepted
methodology is developed, continual updates in the estimates are necessary in light of
changes in market conditions, production technologies, and geological data. The value
of the OCS oil and gas rights is large. Having an accurate assessment of their worth is
important for both macroeconomic and microeconomic policy decisions.
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Notes
1. Unless stated otherwise, all figures have been converted to 1987 dollars using the GNP
implicit price deflator.
2. The original published total estimate by Boskin et al. (1985) was $1,032 billion (1987
dollars). Boskin and Robinson (1987) later discovered errors in their calculations and subsequently
published the revised figure of $656 billion (1987 dollars), or, equivalently, $521 billion in 1981
dollars. The $498 billion figure for offshore holdings in 1981 (1987 dollars) was drawn from
correspondence between the authors and Boskin.
3. Prior .to exploration, the amount of resources in a prospect is a random variable. After
exporation, the size of the deposit is revealed. The quantity, Mj, is the smallest deposit size that a
firm can profitably develop now. When calculating the profitability of developing a field, the
exploration costs are treated as a sunk cost. If the deposit size is below Mj, it is more profitable to
abandon the field and search for oil and gas elsewhere.
4. For scheduling purposes MMS has divided the OCS into 22 planning areas. Separate Aj
factors and resource estimates are developed for each area. All of our computations have been
done at the planning area level. For purposes of presentation we have reaggregated the planning
areas into four major regions: Alaska, Pacific, Gulf of Mexico, and Atlantic.
5. The term "economically developable resources" refers to, in MMS terminology, "eco-
nomically recoverable resources." We have changed the terms slightly because the MMS term
does not distinguish between developable and explorable resources.
6. We recognize that different organizations interpret geological and geophysical informa-
tion differently. What is an explorable prospect to one party might be unexplorable to another.
7. In the 1983 estimates, the value of Aj for the 18 planning areas used ranged from 1 in
proven regions to 0.43 for an area in Alaska. As a result of the recent dismal exploration results in188 D, H, Rosenthal, M, B, Rose, and L J, Slaski
Alaska, the Aj figures for Alaska have been revised downward. In 1983 the average Aj for an
Alaskan area was 0.67; in the recently issued five-year OCS plan, the equivalent figure was 0.18.
8. A small portion of this drop can be attributed to production between the time interval of
the two estimates.
9. The data on the quantity and characteristics of the unexplored resources were drawn from
Tables 5 and 6A in Appendix F of the five-year OCS planning document recently issued by MMS
(1987). The data on reserves were drawn from proprietary reserve reports issued by the Gulf of
Mexico and California MMS regional offices. The reserve reports, which show the quantity of
economically extractable resources contained in known fields, were dated June 1986 and were the
latest available at the time of this analysis.
10. The starting price of the resource equals WjP" + (1 - Wj)(.67)P'' where: Wj = the
proportion of the BOEs (calculated on BTU equivalent basis) in region j from oil; (1 - Wj) = the
fraction of the BOEs from gas; and P" is the price of oil. The formula shows we have assumed gas
sells for two-thirds the price of oil on a BTU equivalent basis.
11. We have used the best information available to us to approximate the various functions
and parameters used in (5). Most of the data about costs and production rates were derived from
models the MMS uses to evaluate the economic value of OCS tracts. Many of the inputs to these
models were based on engineering relationships found to adequately represent operations on the
OCS. Within a planning area, we used different figures for shallow and deep water.
12. The NEV for a planning area is a weighted average of the NEV figures for each individ-
ual prospect. The weights are the expected amount of resources contained in each prospect. The
TSL80 computer program, which is a sophisticated discounted cash flow model for offshore oil
and gas operations, was used to calculate the prospect-specific NEV values. Documentation on the
TSL80 program is available from the authors.
13. NEV(t)ij is a measure of the expected NEV per barrel in year t for a prospect if it were
leased t years from the present. Equations (4), (5), and (6) assume t = 0, which is a reasonable
assumption for resources that have already been leased. For the unleased and unexplored re-
sources, the expected economic value depends on when the resources are leased.
14. In equations (8) through (12) the subscripts have been dropped from the right-hand side of
the equation and the cost parameters now refer to the weighted planning area averages.
15. The upper bound of the summation in (9) is set at 29 because our analysis only considers
resources that become explorable through the year 2016. We stopped at that year for two reason:
(1) because of discounting, it is doubtful that extending the time horizon further into the future
would significantly affect the present value computations; and (2) if we extended our analysis
further into the future, then our assumed price growth rate would push prices beyond the range for
which we have data on the amount of explorable resources. Our data on the amount of explorable
resources is strictly valid only up to a 1987 world price of $32.19 per barrel. For example, if our
analysis ran until the year 2050 and we used a 3 percent growth, we would need to know the
amount of explorable resources at $116 per barrel. Our data do not answer that question, nor does
any other data set of which we are aware.
16. Appendix F tables the quantity of explorable resources for different price levels. We
computed the price for each year of our analysis, Pg', and interpolated from the table to compute
L,*. In equation (9), Lf is the amount of resources that were not leasable in year t — 1, but are
leasable in year t. With a known and rising price path, L,* is positive.
17. Royalties are charged on the market price of the resource less the shipment costs.
18. Equation (12) cannot be used to calculate NEV(O)o; it is valid only for resources that just
became leasable in year t. Many of the resources leasable in year zero were also leasable prior to
year zero.
19. For the reserves, we did not evaluate equation (4) for each size class of fields in each
planning area. Instead, we used the results of our runs on the unexplored prospects to indicate
what the economically representative field size for reserves in each planning area would be. Our
calculation of the NEV per barrel was then based on this representative field size.
20. The NEV figures in Appendix F were developed for the unleased and unexplored re-Economic Value of the OCS 189
sources. We also applied them to the leased and unexplored resources under the assumption that
the values are approximately the same. However, for two planning areas in Alaska, Navarin Basin
and Beaufort Sea, we used equation (12), evaluated at 1987 prices, to estimate the NEV of the
leased and unexplored resources. There were no explorable resources in those areas at mid-1987
prices, so a $0 figure was used in Appendix F for those two areas.
21. Some of the resources in the abandoned leases might not meet the criteria for inclusion in
the unleased and undiscovered category. If this occurs, then those resources will no longer show
up in our accounting framework.
22. When evaluating (13) we calculated the royalties from the three classes of resources-
leased and unexplored, undeveloped reserves, and developed reserves—separately. Our calcula-
tions, therefore, used a different value for Uj and Vj for each class of resource.
23. Given the information available to us, in order to develop these estimates we had to
assume that the quantity of explorable resources in the 3 percent, 3 percent case was the same as
in the 6 percent, 2 percent case. Thus the 3 percent, 3 percent estimates are a revaluation of the
quantity of resources used in the 6 percent, 2 percent case. As a result, our estimates are lower
bound estimates because they do not account for the increased quantity of resources available
under a 3 percent discount rate and 3 percent price growth rate. The Boskin et al. (1985, 1987)
estimates are similarly affected because their quantity measure is based on the MMS resource
estimates (1983). The MMS did not use 3 percent price and discount rates when quantifying the
amount of economically recoverable resources.
24. Appendix F of the five-year leasing plan contains much of this type of information (MMS
1987).
25. Persons familiar with the MMS reserve numbers indicate that they do include a portion of
the inferred reserves. If this is true, then our economic value estimates also include a portion of
the inferred reserves.